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Abstract 
This paper articulates Sigmund Freud‟s conceptualization of the social world by 
surveying and critically examining four of his major sociological works: Civilized‟ 
Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness (Freud, 1908/1991b), Totem and Taboo 
(Freud, 1913/1946), The Future of An Illusion (Freud, 1927/1991d), and Civilization and 
Its Discontents (Freud, 1930/1991a). The paper also embeds the development of 
Freud‟s social theory within its historical context by discussing the impact of various 
evolutionary, philosophical, and life event influences. It is argued that Freud‟s social 
theory is merely a projection of his psychological theory of mind, which is predicated 
on the biogenetic principle (i.e., ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny). In tracing the 
development of Freud‟s social theory over time, an isomorphism is revealed whereby 
the changes in Freud‟s psychological thought reflect the changes in his social 
thought. In this way, Freud‟s sociology can be said to recapitulate his psychology 
despite Freud‟s insistence otherwise. 
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Sigmund Freud is renowned for inventing the psychological paradigm of the mind 
known as psychoanalysis, which is acclaimed and revered by some, and denigrated 
and scorned by others. Indeed, it is fitting that opinions about psychoanalysis within 
the field of psychology are marked by ambivalence seemingly more than any other 
popular psychological theory. I contend that this ambivalence stems from the 
radical comprehensiveness of psychoanalysis, which Freud extended beyond the 
psychological and into the social realm. In a sense, psychoanalysis is a theory of 
everything. It is a story that depicts the state and development of the human 
condition spanning from prehistory to predictions about the future of civilization, 
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across the life-span, and from unconscious processes dwelling within the depths of 
the mind to conscious processes at the forefront of waking life. 
This paper will navigate the vastness of psychoanalysis with the aim of extracting the 
core of Freud‟s social theory. In doing so, it will be necessary to embed Freud‟s social 
view within its theoretical and historical context in order to elucidate its origins. To 
accomplish this task, the paper will be composed of two sections. The first section will 
involve discussing how various evolutionary and philosophical ideas came to 
influence Freud‟s extension of his psychological theory to his social theory. In 
addition, relevant historical and personal life events will be discussed where it is 
believed that they impacted Freud‟s social theory. 
In the second section of the paper, Freud‟s social worldview will be explicated with a 
view towards highlighting exactly how his conceptualization of the social world 
corresponds with his psychological theory. I will first draw upon and discuss four works 
that I believe provide the foundation for his social theory – namely, „Civilized‟ Sexual 
Morality and Modern Nervous Illness (Freud, 1908/1991b), Totem and Taboo (Freud, 
1913/1946), The Future of An Illusion (Freud, 1927/1991d), and Civilization and Its 
Discontents (Freud, 1930/1991a). I then explicitly argue that Freud‟s social theory is 
merely a projection of his psychological theory, and as such, it assumes that the 
dynamics of the individual psyche are isomorphic with the dynamics of the social 
world. Moreover, it will be revealed that Freud‟s application of psychoanalysis to the 
social realm was uni-directional. That is, while Freud was adamant that his 
psychology recapitulated his sociology, it will become clear that his sociology in fact 
recapitulated his psychology. This latter point is not trivial; since Freud's sociology was 
borne out of his psychology and not vice versa, his sociology is not unique and is 
sustainable only insofar as the tenets (primarily the Oedipal process) of his 
psychology hold true. 
Historical and Theoretical Backdrop of Freud‟s Social Theory 
In order to understand Freud‟s conceptualization of the social world, it is necessary 
to understand the evolutionary principles, philosophical ideas, and life events that 
drove his theorizing. Thus, this section will highlight how these various influences 
anticipated and contributed to the development of Freud‟s social theory. 
Evolutionary Influences 
Freud‟s social theory was heavily influenced by the evolutionary climate of his time, 
and particularly by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Charles Darwin, and Ernst Haeckel (De 
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Luca, 1977; Sulloway, 1982; Wallace, 1983). The biogenetic law – first propounded by 
the natural philosopher Carl Friedrich Kielmayer, endorsed by Darwin, and 
reinterpreted and popularized by Haeckel (Wallace, 1983) – is essentially the 
mechanism that Freud uses to expound his social theory. According to the 
biogenetic law advanced by Haeckel, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, or in 
other words, in man, the development from fetus to adulthood (i.e., ontogeny) is a 
brief recapitulation of the entire history of the race (i.e., phylogeny). Haeckel, the 
German apostle of Darwin (Wallace, 1983), believed that adult stages become 
modified by experience and that these modifications are then inherited and 
recapitulated at increasingly earlier stages in the descendants, such that ontogeny 
was thought to be a sort of memory for phylogeny – the experiences of which 
become condensed and abbreviated by ontogenetic repetition (Sulloway, 1982). 
Sulloway notes that in currently accepted Darwinian theory, however, there is no 
such recapitulation in the Haeckelian sense, as embryos are not miniature versions of 
ancestral adults but merely embryos that resemble one another more closely than 
adults simply because natural selection has acted far more intensely upon the adult 
states during the course of evolution thereby causing later stages, but not the 
embryos, to diverge. In the preface to the third edition (1915) of the Three Essays on 
the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905/1953), Freud explicitly states his view of the 
biogenetic law: 
Ontogenesis may be regarded as a recapitulation of 
phylogenesis, in so far as the latter has not been modified by 
more recent experience. The phylogenetic disposition can be 
seen at work behind the ontogenetic process. But disposition 
is ultimately the precipitate of earlier experience of the 
species to which the more recent experience of the 
individual, as the sum of the accidental factors, is super-
added. (p. 131) 
While it is believed that Freud read Haeckel, it is perhaps Darwin that exerted the 
most influence on Freud, as it is thought that Freud not only owned virtually every 
work by Darwin, but Darwin was also one of the few individuals that Freud was not 
shy to mention his intellectual indebtedness (De Luca, 1977; Wallace, 1983). As such, 
Darwin‟s Lamarckism and belief in the biogenetic law were particularly influential on 
Freud (Ritvo, 1965). In light of Lamarck‟s model, which allowed for the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, Darwin thought it possible for humans to inherit quite 
complicated behavioral traits (e.g., idiosyncratic physical mannerisms and personal 
habits) as well as complex mental attributes (Wallace, 1983). The impact of 
Lamarckian and biogenetic thinking on Darwin is especially salient in his assertion 
that “every human brain passes in the course of its development through the same 
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stages as those occurring in the lower vertebrate animals.” (1872, as cited in 
Wallace, 1983, p. 245). 
Freud‟s social theory was also indebted to several evolutionary anthropologists; there 
is direct evidence that he read John Lubbock, Herbert Spencer, and Edward Tylor, 
and a strong probability that he was familiar with the works of Lewis Morgan, John 
Ferguson McLennan, and Johann Jakob Bachofen (Wallace, 1983). According to 
Wallace, the views of these anthropologists had several fundamental notions in 
common. First, they believed that the history of human society is a development 
following very closely to one general law. Second, they presupposed man‟s psychic 
unity, the assumption of which is that the human mind works the same way in all 
individuals irrespective of various tribes and nations. Third, they espoused the 
doctrine of survivals, which essentially meant that processes, customs, opinions, and 
so forth, were carried on by force of habit into new societies different from that in 
which they had their original home, and thus they remained as proofs and 
exemplars of older cultures out of which newer ones evolved. Fourth, in line with their 
concept of survivals and their conviction that one could rank cultures on a scale of 
development, the anthropologists adopted the „comparative method‟, which 
involved extrapolating from known stages of development in one culture to 
unknown stages in another. Finally, many of the anthropologists adhered to the 
Lamarckian notion of the transmission of cultural traits and the belief that the 
biogenetic law could be extended to psychic phenomena. Thus, Wallace argues 
that Freud was influenced by many of the ideas from these evolutionary thinkers, 
which is consistent with Freud‟s insistence throughout his career that “the 
phylogenetic foundation has . . . the upper hand” (Freud, 1940/1964a, pp. 188-189), 
and by extension, his insistence that his psychology recapitulates his sociology. 
Philosophical Influences 
Wallace (1983) notes that at about the same time that Freud was reading Darwin, 
he was also reading the works of David Hume, Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach, and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. These philosophers equipped Freud with the intellectual seeds 
that would help germinate not only his psychological theory but his social theory in 
particular. According to Wallace for example, in the Natural History of Religion 
(Hume, 1757, as cited in Wallace, 1983), Hume looked at his subject 
developmentally, viewed polytheism as the earliest stage of religion, thought that 
man conceived his deities as having qualities like himself, and viewed the origin of 
religion as stemming from passion, not curiosity. Similarly, Feuerbach (1841, 1849, as 
cited in Wallace, 1983) viewed religion as a necessary stage in the development of 
man‟s self-consciousness, believed that religion everywhere preceded philosophy 
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among both individuals and the human race, believed that animal worship 
everywhere preceded that of anthropomorphic deities, and saw religion as 
infantilism. In this way, both Hume and Feuerbach can be regarded as anticipating 
Freud‟s The Future of an Illusion. 
Gay (1989, p. xxi) opines that Freud attempted to stay away from Nietzsche 
“precisely because he sensed how relevant” he was to his “terrain”, which is 
consistent with Wallace‟s (1983) contention that there lurked some embarrassment 
on Freud‟s part at the many parallels (e.g., repression, sublimation, aggression, the 
unconscious) between his own work and Nietzsche‟s. Indeed, Wallace notes that by 
1873, Freud had read everything Nietzsche had written up to that point. According 
to Wallace, like Hume, Nietzsche (1878, 1880, as cited in Wallace, 1983) also posited 
that religion arose in passion, whereby Nietzsche believed that on the basis of 
human needs and emotions, the human intellect caused the phenomenon of 
religion. Moreover, Wallace contends that Nietzsche anticipated Freud‟s Totem and 
Taboo insofar as Nietzsche viewed dreams and poetry as connected to primitive 
thought, and via his endorsement of the application of the biogenetic law to the 
psychic domain: “There must, too, be grooves and twists in our brains which answer 
to that [prehistoric] condition of mind, as in the form of certain human organs there 
are supposed to be traces of a fish-state.” (Nietzsche, 1878, as cited in Wallace, 
1983, pp. 63-64). 
Life Event Influences 
A few notable historical and personal life events are relevant to the development of 
Freud‟s social theory and therefore are worth highlighting. Wallace (1983) notes that 
Freud‟s infatuation with archaeology and ancient societies began in childhood and 
continued throughout his life; indeed, Freud was known to be an antiquity collector, 
and one-fifth of the titles in Freud‟s London library – which consisted only of what the 
Nazis allowed him to take – are on archaeology and ancient history (Wallace, 1983). 
Moreover, Wallace speculates that Freud‟s cultural consciousness may have been 
increased both by his ambivalent attitude towards his Jewish identity and by the 
growing Viennese anti-Semitism of his time. In this way, Freud‟s cultural interests and 
view of society were tainted by an interaction between his intellectual proclivities 
toward the study of archaeology and the political climate in which he lived. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the grim tone of Freud‟s Civilization and Its 
Discontents owes much to the growing power of Nazism both in Germany and in 
Austria; and that the final sentence in Civilization and Its Discontents, which was 
added by Freud in the second edition of 1931 (I quote this sentence later in the 
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paper), may be understood to mirror Freud‟s dismay over the electoral triumph of 
Hitler‟s NSDAP in the elections to the German Reichstag the previous September 
(Gay, 1989). In addition, as Fancher (1998) suggests, the increasing philosophical 
and pessimistic tone of Freud‟s writing, as illustrated in The Future of an Illusion and 
Civilization and Its Discontents, might also have been influenced by the difficult 
fourteen remaining years of his life whereby he underwent a long series of painful 
and disfiguring operations as a result of being diagnosed with mouth cancer. 
Finally, and interestingly, it has been suggested that Freud‟s Totem and Taboo was 
essentially an answer to Carl Gustav Jung. Schmidl (1952) explains that just prior to 
the publication of Totem and Taboo, Jung began publishing his deviating ideas from 
psychoanalysis, which included his view that the Oedipus phantasy was „irreal‟ 
insofar that actual incest had never played any role in the history of mankind. 
Moreover, Jung explained the human psyche through myths, which precluded the 
search for the ultimate biological basis of the human psyche through the 
metaphysical postulate of a „collective unconscious.‟ For Freud, this was a betrayal 
of psychoanalysis, and was unacceptable because he believed that an explanation 
of the basic qualities of man had to be based upon biology. In this way, Freud 
searched for the links that connected human history with biology and that 
connected the beginning of civilized society with prehistoric man, which he found in 
the myth of the primeval patricide. While it remains an assumption that Totem and 
Taboo is essentially a polemical book directed at Jung, it is at the very least likely 
that those of Freud‟s followers who were interested in religion, myth, and fairy tales 
(e.g., Otto Rank, Theodor Reik, and Carl Gustav Jung) served to influence the 
direction of his anthropological and sociological ideas (Schmidl, 1952). 
Summary 
It is in light of this historical and theoretical context that Freud became equipped 
with the intellectual framework to develop his social theory. Drawing from this 
framework, as will become apparent in the next section, it was Freud's belief in the 
biogenetic principle that was chiefly integral to his application of psychoanalytic 
theory to his social theory. 
Tracing the Development of Freud‟s Social Theory 
To Freud, psychoanalysis was clearly a social theory as well as a psychological 
theory. This section is dedicated to illustrating exactly how Freud‟s social theory 
corresponds to his psychological theory of the mind (i.e., psychoanalysis). I trace the 
development of Freud‟s social theorizing through four major works – namely, 
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„Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness (Freud, 1908/1991b), Totem 
and Taboo (Freud, 1913/1946), The Future of An Illusion (Freud, 1927/1991d), and 
Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud, 1930/1991a) – and highlight along the way 
precisely how Freud predicates his social worldview on psychoanalysis. It should be 
noted that space precludes an exhaustive in-depth survey of all socially-relevant 
Freudian works, and as such, the works I have chosen to discuss center around 
macro-level social processes, such as the development and organization of culture, 
civilization, and religion. Thus, other important works that discuss micro-level social 
processes will not be discussed. For example, I will not touch upon Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego (Freud, 1921/1991c), which is concerned with 
interpersonal (cf., Being In Love and Hypnosis) and micro-group level processes (cf., 
Two Artificial Groups: The Church and The Army), nor will I discuss Moses and 
Monotheism (Freud, 1939/1964b), which is primarily concerned with leadership and 
does not offer anything new with respect to Freud‟s social theory (Wallace, 1977). 
„Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness 
Freud‟s first sociological exposition, entitled „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern 
Nervous Illness, was first published in March, 1908 (Gay, 1989). In this work, Freud 
discusses for the first time at length the antagonism between civilization and 
instinctual life. To begin, Freud notes that his clinical observations had led him to 
differentiate between two groups of nervous disorders: the neuroses proper and the 
psychoneuroses. Importantly, the etiology of the neuroses proper (which Freud 
mentions are commonly grouped together as „neurasthenia‟) is strictly sexual in 
nature and does not involve a “hereditary taint.” In other words, these neuroses 
have nothing to do with civilization per se (the significance of which will become 
salient in a moment), and their etiology only involves disturbances or “injurious 
influences” that occur during sexual development or sexual life. On the other hand, 
with the psychoneuroses (e.g., hysteria and obsessional neurosis), Freud contends 
that “the influence of heredity is more marked and the causation less transparent” 
(p. 38), and that civilization may play a causal role by virtue of its influence in the 
suppression of sexual instincts: 
They spring from the sexual needs of people who are 
unsatisfied and represent for them a kind of substitutive 
satisfaction. We must therefore view all factors which impair 
sexual life, suppress [italics added] its activity or distort its aims 
as being pathogenic factors in the psychoneuroses as well 
(p. 38). 
The upshot of Freud‟s nervous disorder distinction is that suppression of the sexual 
instincts can result in psychoneuroses, and that this suppression is also precisely how 
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civilization develops; and indeed, as articulated in Totem and Taboo, this suppression 
is partly responsible for the origins of civilization in the first place. Freud contends in 
„Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness that “generally speaking, our 
civilization is built up on the suppression of instincts” (p. 38). When sexual instincts 
become suppressed, they find their expression either through the process of 
sublimation, which according to Freud is the “capacity to exchange . . . sexual aim 
for another one, which is no longer sexual but which is psychically related to the first 
aim” (p. 39), or they exhibit an obstinate fixation, which renders them 
“unserviceable” and sometimes causes them to “degenerate into abnormities.” 
Importantly, then, suppression of the sexual instincts may result in psychoneuroses 
(via the sexual instincts becoming fixated) or it may result in the pursuit of cultural 
activities and the development of civilization (via sublimation). According to Freud, 
the intensity of the sexual instincts and the proportion that is possible to sublimate are 
individual differences. In alluding to a machine that cannot indefinitely transform 
heat into mechanical energy, Freud notes that a person cannot sublimate 
indefinitely and must succumb to the hedonistic pleasure of the sexual instincts at 
least occasionally in order to avoid illness. However, Freud makes a case that finding 
this balance is a rarity; for reasons which will become clear in my discussion of 
Civilization and Its Discontents. 
Thus, Freud raises the question as to “whether our „civilized‟ sexual morality is worth 
the sacrifice which it imposes on us” (p. 55). In other words, Freud wonders whether 
the suppression of our sexual instincts, which on the one hand, serves to develop 
civilization by re-directing libidinal energy into productive cultural pursuits, and on 
the other hand, results in psychoneuroses that inevitably stifle those same cultural 
activities, is worth the return on investment. 
It is noteworthy that „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness was 
devoted to describing the development and maintenance of civilization, as 
opposed to the origins of civilization, which Freud would go on to address in Totem 
and Taboo. In addition, „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness was 
devoted to explicating the antagonistic role of the sexual instincts, as opposed to 
the role of aggressive or destructive instincts. Interestingly, however, while in his 
Editor‟s Note (Freud, 1908/1991b, pp. 29-31) Dickson maintains that Freud does not at 
all mention the aggressive instincts in „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous 
Illness, close inspection reveals that Freud does indeed briefly foreshadow their role 
in the development of civilization, albeit the sexual instincts are given far more 
weight: 
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Each individual has surrendered some part of his assets – 
some part of the sense of omnipotence or of the aggressive 
or vindictive inclinations in his personality. From these 
contributions has grown civilization‟s common assets in 
material and ideal wealth. Besides the exigencies of life, no 
doubt it has been family feelings, derived from eroticism, that 
have induced the separate individuals to make this 
renunciation. The renunciation has been a progressive one in 
the course of the evolution of civilization. (p. 38-39) 
Although no more regard is given to the aggressive instincts in the rest of „Civilized‟ 
Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, the above passage shows that Freud 
was already beginning to contemplate their role in the development of civilization; 
which he would eventually elaborate on in great detail in Civilization and Its 
Discontents. 
While „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness was Freud‟s first full-
length discussion of the antagonism between civilization and instinctual life, Dickson, 
in his Editor‟s Note (Freud, 1908/1991b, pp. 29-31), highlights that Freud was 
contemplating his application of psychoanalysis to the social realm much earlier. For 
instance, in a memorandum sent to his close friend Wilhelm Fliess on May 31st 1897, 
Freud contended that incest was anti-social and that civilization involved its 
progressive renunciation (Freud, 1897/1966). Similarly, in his paper Sexuality in the 
Aetiology of the Neuroses (Freud, 1898/1961b), Freud concluded that civilization 
could justifiably be regarded as partly responsible for the spread of neurasthenia; 
albeit not because of sexual suppression per se, but rather because contraception 
as a tool of civilization serves to impair sexual enjoyment and negatively impact 
sexual life, thereby causing illness. Finally, in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(Freud, 1905/1953), Freud spoke of the inverse relation between civilization and the 
free development of human sexuality. 
Totem and Taboo 
In the first three essays that compose Totem and Taboo – The Horror of Incest, Taboo 
and Emotional Ambivalence, and Animism, Magic and the Omnipotence of 
Thoughts – Freud presents cultural-anthropological, sociological, and psychological 
evidence to build a case for the argument he would present in his widely regarded 
controversial fourth and final essay. It is in this fourth essay, The Return of Totemism in 
Childhood (Freud, 1913/1989), that Freud explicitly launches his theory that the 
origins of “religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex” (p. 
510). 
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Drawing explicitly from the work of J. G. Frazer, Charles Darwin, J. J. Atkinson, and his 
own clinical case formulations, Freud directly aims to use psychoanalysis to explain 
the origins of the two taboos of totemism: the law protecting the totem animal and 
the prohibition of incest. In constructing his argument, he first generalizes the findings 
from his phobic patient Little Hans (Freud, 1905/1955) and Sandor Ferenczi‟s phobic 
patient Little Arpad (as cited in Freud, 1913/1989) to conclude that the majority of 
animal phobias stem from a fear related to the father. Freud further invokes these 
cases to infer that it is common for people to displace their feelings from their father 
on to an animal, and that what typically follows is a projected ambivalent emotional 
attitude towards the animal (characterized by both hatred and affection), which 
culminates to identification with the animal. This psychological theory of the Oedipal 
process sets the stage for Freud‟s parricide hypothesis, which is essentially the 
foundation of his social theory. 
The parricide hypothesis proposes the literal reenactment of the Oedipus complex 
by our ancestors. Freud contends that in the prehistoric primeval family, the brothers 
of the primal horde had initially been banished by the ruling father, who kept all of 
the females for himself. The brothers then banded together, killed, and devoured 
their father, which ended the patriarchal horde. By devouring the father, the 
brothers came to identify with him. In light of the ambivalence felt for the father, the 
brothers were overwhelmed by guilt over his murder. Out of this filial sense of guilt, 
the two taboos of totemism were created, which corresponded to the two 
repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex; that is, the repressed wish of sexual 
yearning for the mother corresponded with the exogamy rule and the repressed wish 
of wanting to kill the father corresponded with the rule governing protection of the 
totem. Freud then goes on to speculate about the development of the notion of 
God and Christianity (the ideas of which become more fully formed in The Future of 
An Illusion), and importantly, postulates that the unconscious memory and guilt over 
killing the father is inherited from generation to generation. 
Interestingly, while Freud admits that his premises contain a great degree of 
uncertainty, he nevertheless is adamant that his literal depiction of the primeval 
Oedipal scene might have been an historical reality. He suggests that the minds of 
neurotics and primeval man are very similar in that they both “prefer psychic to 
factual reality and react just as seriously to thoughts as normal people do to realities” 
(p. 512). There is an important difference, however, between neurotics and primitive 
men: 
But neurotics are above all inhibited in their actions: with 
them the thought is a complete substitute for the deed. 
Europe‟s Journal of Psychology 
192 
 
Primitive men, on the other hand, are uninhibited: thought 
passes directly into action. With them it is rather the deed that 
is a substitute for the thought. And that is why, without laying 
claim to any finality of judgment, I think that in the case 
before us it may safely be assumed that „in the beginning 
was the Deed.‟ (p. 513) 
In addition to Freud‟s belief that the “Deed” actually took place, the corollary point 
that I am trying to make salient is that yet again, he draws upon his psychological 
theory (of the neurotic mind) in order to generate conclusions about primitive men, 
and consequently, the social world. Moreover, Freud essentially predicates the 
arguments made in Totem and Taboo on the biogenetic principle. He actually 
explicitly addresses this issue by stating “I have taken as the basis of my whole 
position the existence of a collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as 
they do in the mind of an individual” (p. 511). Freud further admits that “these are 
grave difficulties; and any explanation that could avoid presumptions of such a kind 
would seem to be preferable” (p. 511). That being said, he goes on to defend his 
position by asserting that it must be possible for psychical processes to continue from 
one generation to the next, or else social psychology in general could not exist. 
The Future of An Illusion 
While Totem and Taboo was concerned with explicating the roots of civilization, The 
Future of An Illusion was Freud‟s major work on religion as a contemporary social 
phenomenon. In this work, Freud likens religious ideas to powerful illusions that 
originate from the combination of both phylogenetically transmitted historical 
recollections (as outlined in Totem and Taboo) and the most pressing infantile wishes 
of mankind. These wishes, according to Freud, correspond to the yearning for 
protection through love from the father, which stem from the impression of 
helplessness in childhood. Importantly, Freud asserts that “the recognition that this 
helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a 
father, but this time a more powerful one” (p. 212). Thus, for Freud, religious ideas 
serve the function of a kind of mental protection provided by an illusory and 
powerful father figure. 
The other crux to Freud‟s argument is that religion is the “universal obsessional 
neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of children, it arose out of the 
Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the father” (p. 226). In other words, drawing 
upon his psychological theory, Freud contends that in the developmental process of 
resolving the Oedipus complex, children typically cannot progress to the “civilized 
stage” without first passing through a phase of neurosis. This is because the child 
cannot handle all of the instinctual demands placed upon him or her, and so these 
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demands become tamed via the process of repression, which produces various 
forms of anxiety. Most of the neuroses are overcome spontaneously during the 
natural course of development, which Freud mentions is especially true for the 
obsessional neuroses of childhood. In this vein, Freud argues that in just the same 
way, humanity as a whole, in its development through the ages, fell into a state 
analogous to the childhood obsessional neurosis. Crucially, Freud asserts that in line 
with this typical developmental process, humanity should eventually resolve the 
Oedipus complex and consequently abandon religious beliefs: 
If this view is right, it is to be supposed that a turning-away 
from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability of a 
process of growth, and that we find ourselves at this very 
juncture in the middle of that phase of development. (p. 227) 
Thus, in The Future of An Illusion, Freud extends his psychological theory to his social 
theory by means of diagnosing religion as an obsessional neurosis that parallels the 
experience of children during development. Here again, as in Totem and Taboo, 
Freud invokes the biogenetic law to argue that the ontogenetic Oedipus complex of 
the individual reflects the phylogenetic Oedipus complex of the human species. The 
biogenetic law also underlies the premise that the infantile wishes of the helpless 
individual child correspond to the wishes of the helpless human species. 
Civilization and Its Discontents 
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud explicitly returns to the theme of antagonism 
between the expression of primal instincts and the development and maintenance 
of civilization. He expounds a convoluted albeit vivid rendition of how his most recent 
contributions to psychoanalytic theory – namely, the superego and the death 
instinct and its derivatives (i.e., the aggressive and destructive instincts) – apply to his 
evolved social worldview. In updating his social theory, Freud begins in the first 
chapter by reiterating his message from The Future of An Illusion; namely that the 
origin of religious attitudes and beliefs can be clearly traced to the feeling of infantile 
helplessness. 
In the second chapter, Freud argues that the purpose of life is to satisfy the pleasure 
principle, whereby he details a variety of ways that this can be achieved – such as 
via sublimation, illusions (e.g., satisfaction through art and beauty), and engulfment 
in love (including sexual gratification). Freud asserts that these activities essentially 
represent various ways to mitigate three sources of suffering: the deterioration of the 
body, ravages from the external world (e.g., natural disasters), and inadequate 
relations with other people (including lovers, friends, family, and society). In an 
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attempt to avoid pain and neuroses as best as possible, Freud prescribes evenly 
distributing one‟s libidinal energy rather than placing all eggs in one basket, so to 
speak. Thus, for Freud, “happiness . . . is a problem of the economics of the libido. 
There is no golden rule which applies to everyone: every man must find out for 
himself in what particular fashion he can be saved” (p. 271). Interestingly, Freud 
further comments that by virtue of religion forcing a state of psychic infantilism and 
mass-delusion, it serves to restrict one‟s path to the acquisition of happiness and 
protection from suffering, and consequently, it succeeds “in sparing many people an 
individual neurosis . . . but hardly anything more” (p. 273). 
Freud uses the third chapter to build upon his thoughts regarding the third source of 
human suffering (i.e., inadequate relations with other people). He suggests that 
“civilization is largely responsible for our misery” (p. 274) and devotes the rest of the 
chapter to describing the general nature of civilization. He contends that order and 
cleanliness are important requirements of civilization, and in this respect, he alludes 
to the development of anal eroticism in children and then points out the similarity 
between the process of civilization and the libidinal development of the individual 
child. 
In chapter four, Freud refers to Totem and Taboo to introduce the notion that Eros 
(Love) and Ananke (Necessity) became the initial parents of civilization following the 
overthrow of the primal father. He further describes the function of Eros as serving to 
bind together considerable numbers of people, which civilization has ironically come 
to tame by virtue of restricting the sexual instincts of individuals. Even heterosexual 
genital love is restricted in the form of legitimacy and monogamy: 
In no other case does Eros so clearly betray the core of his 
being, his purpose of making one out of more than one; but 
when he has achieved this in the proverbial way through the 
love of two human beings, he refuses to go further. (p. 298) 
This antithesis between civilization and sexuality in particular was discussed in 
„Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness. 
To understand the cause of the antagonism between civilization and sexuality, Freud 
invokes the notion of the death instinct (the term „Thanatos‟ is never actually 
employed by Freud in any of his works) in chapter five. He explains that the 
“inclination to aggression . . . is the factor which disturbs our relations with our 
neighbor and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure [of energy]” (p. 
302). The aggressive instinct, which is a derivative of the death instinct, is responsible 
for the antagonism between civilization and sexuality because uninhibited sexuality 
would result in rampant competition, which would lead to ubiquitous aggressive 
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activity. Freud thought that the instinctual passions were stronger than reasonable 
interests (i.e., common work and interests) and that civilization had to invest a 
tremendous amount of energy in order to set limits to man‟s aggressive instincts: 
Hence, therefore, the use of methods intended to incite 
people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of 
love, hence the restriction upon sexual life, and hence too 
the ideal‟s commandment to love one‟s neighbour as oneself 
– a commandment which is really justified by the fact that 
nothing else runs so strongly counter to the original nature of 
man. (p. 303) 
In this vein, the death instinct, in opposition to Eros, threatens to tear civilization 
apart. As such, civilization encourages the suppression (note that Freud is unclear 
about the distinction between suppression and repression) of both the sexual and 
aggressive instincts, albeit at the cost of man‟s happiness in exchange “for a portion 
of security” (p. 306). 
In chapter six, Freud makes it explicitly clear that he is applying psychoanalysis to his 
conceptualization of the social world. He outlines how in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (Freud, 1920/1961a), his former distinction between ego-instincts and 
object-instincts became subsumed under the power of Eros, whereby „libido‟ came 
to denote the energy of Eros in order to distinguish it from the energy (which 
incidentally was not given a label) of the death instinct. Civilization is considered to 
be “a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human 
individuals, and after that families then races, peoples and nations, into one great 
unity, the unity of mankind” (p. 313). The aggressive instinct acting as a derivative 
and representative of the death instinct is always in opposition to Eros, at both the 
individual and social level, rendering “the meaning of the evolution of civilization” a 
constant struggle “between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it 
works itself out in the human species” (p. 314). 
The final two chapters are devoted to delineating how the superego serves as the 
mechanism that civilization employs in order to inhibit aggressiveness. Here again, 
Freud explicitly mentions that we can draw upon the history of the development of 
the individual in order to infer the process by which the superego exerts its effects. In 
the individual, aggressiveness is internalized and introjected back on to the ego, 
thereby re-directing the aggressive instinct energy. That is, the aggressive energy 
that was originally directed at other people is taken over by the agency of the 
superego, and in the form of „conscience‟ (which Freud describes as the function of 
the superego), is ready to displace back on to the ego. The tension between the 
harsh superego and the ego generates „the sense of guilt‟, which expresses itself as 
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a need for punishment. In the same way, Freud describes epochs of civilizations as 
having their own superego (which he called the cultural superego), with the sense of 
guilt originating from the Oedipus complex, which was acquired at the killing of the 
father by the primal brothers (as described in Totem and Taboo). 
Importantly, Freud contends that by means of the superego, it is the aggressive 
intention, not necessarily the act that invokes a sense of guilt. Thus, the effect of 
aggressive instinct renunciation on the conscience is that “every piece of aggression 
whose satisfaction the subject gives up is taken over by the superego and increases 
the latter‟s aggressiveness (against the ego)” (p. 321). This unconscious sense of guilt 
is phylogenetically transmitted to every individual as a result of the transmission of 
ambivalence surrounding the Oedipus complex. Crucially for Freud, the sense of guilt 
intensifies and strengthens as the community widens, since civilization is under the 
spell of Eros, which tries to erotically unite all human beings. As Eros widens its range, 
so too does the death instinct, and so too does the feeling of ambivalence 
originating from the Oedipus complex, which can be conceived of as extending 
from an individual‟s father to society at large. In other words, ambivalent affection 
and hatred stemming from the Oedipus complex, represented as Eros and the death 
instinct, respectively, is extended beyond the family, which necessarily increases the 
sense of guilt by virtue of amplifying aggressive wishes (originally confined to the 
father within the family) toward other people in society. In this vein, Freud asserts that 
the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilization in 
that “the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through 
the heightening of the sense of guilt” (p. 327). At bottom, the sense of guilt coincides 
to fear of the superego, which results in a form of enduring anxiety produced by 
civilization that either remains to a large extent unconscious or manifests as a sort of 
malaise and general dissatisfaction. 
In the final pages of the book, Freud acknowledges the similarity between 
psychoanalytic theory and his view of the social world. He contends, however, that 
one feature differs between the developmental process of the individual and the 
process of civilization. In the individual, the main aim is finding happiness, which is 
achieved via satisfaction of the pleasure principle. In contrast, the main aim of 
civilization is to create a unity between individual human beings. This difference, as 
Freud acknowledges, is not a struggle between the primal instincts of Eros and death 
but rather is a dispute within the economics of the libido, which concerns the 
distribution of libido between ego and objects. Freud states then, that “the 
developmental process of the individual can thus be expected to have special 
features of its own which are not reproduced in the process of human civilization” (p. 
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334). As is clear, however, the main aim of civilization is still an application of Eros, 
which is a concept that is derived from Freud‟s psychology theory of the mind. 
Finally, Freud concludes by suggesting that epochs of civilizations can become 
neurotic given the similarity between the development of civilization and the 
individual. However, he also warns that we should be cautious of the implications of 
communal neuroses given that “we are only dealing with analogies and that it is 
dangerous, not only with men but also with concepts, to tear them from the sphere 
in which they have originated and been evolved” (p. 338). Moreover, Freud 
acknowledges that with an individual neurosis, we have a benchmark of normality, 
which is absent in the case of communal neuroses. Thus, the fate of civilization is 
dependent upon Eros‟ ability to conquer the death instinct. Interestingly, in 1931, 
Freud added the following final sentence regarding Eros‟ aforementioned ability, 
which is apparently reflective of his increasing pessimism surrounding the menace of 
Hitler: “But who can foresee with what success and with what result?” (p. 340) 
Isomorphism of Freud‟s Social Theory 
From the previous discussions, it is clear that Freud was conspicuously applying 
psychoanalytic theory to his conceptualization of the social world. Indeed, Freud 
was not hiding the fact that he thought concepts such as the Oedipus complex, 
neuroses, and the superego were social as well as psychological. These concepts 
operated in exactly the same way at both the social and psychological levels. As 
such, despite the fascinating implications, I contend that Freud‟s social worldview is 
merely an application of psychoanalysis that is contingent upon the success of the 
biogenetic principle. That is, without Freud‟s prehistoric reification of the Oedipus 
complex and its phylogenetic transmission, the entirety of Freud‟s social theory falls 
apart. The Oedipal process occurring at the social level is responsible for the origins, 
development, and maintenance of macro-level social processes, including religion, 
culture, and civilization. Thus, Freud‟s social theory is not unique insofar as it merely 
represents psychoanalytic principles operating at the social level of analysis. In this 
vein, despite Freud‟s insistence otherwise, his sociology is in fact a recapitulation of 
his psychology. 
To somewhat digress briefly, it is interesting that in 1983, a lost paper that Freud wrote 
on July 28, 1915 entitled the Overview of the Transference Neuroses was discovered 
in a trunk which belonged to Sandor Ferenczi (see Silverstein, 1989). In this paper, 
Silverstein explains that Freud first warned his audience that his ideas were not 
confirmed, and then he presented a „phylogenetic fantasy‟ whereby he speculated 
that the development of individual psychopathology corresponded to a biogenetic 
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series. That is, psychological disorders purportedly recapitulated a stage in the history 
of human civilization: anxiety hysteria was related to economizing libido during the 
Ice Age; conversion hysteria, to the need to limit overpopulation; obsessional 
neurosis, to the appearance of the primal horde; dementia praecox, to the pressure 
from the primal father to relinquish all sexual objects; paranoia, to the struggle 
against homosexuality instituted by the primal father; melancholia, to remorse over 
the killing of the primal father; and mania, to identification with the primal father. This 
digression (both mine and Freud‟s) attests to Freud‟s conviction regarding the 
biogenetic law and its influence on his thinking (Wallace, 1983). 
In any event, not only is it clear that Freud intended to apply psychoanalytic 
principles to his social theory, but in surveying the works discussed above, it becomes 
evident that his application of psychoanalysis was isomorphic with his social 
theorizing. In other words, as Freud‟s psychological theory of the mind evolved over 
time, so too did his social theory in a correspondingly strict fashion. This isomorphism is 
particularly salient when one considers that „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and Modern 
Nervous Illness was originally published in 1908 and was therefore written within the 
framework of Freud‟s topographical model of the mind; whereas Civilization and Its 
Discontents was originally published in 1930, and was based on Freud‟s structural 
theory of the mind, which he most concretely espoused in 1923 with the publication 
of The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923/1961c). Moreover, it was only after the 
publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle in 1920 that Freud incorporated notions 
of the love and death instincts into his social theory. 
Interestingly, close inspection of Totem and Taboo reveals the seeds of what was to 
become Freud‟s concept of the superego: 
Thus after a long lapse of time their bitterness against their 
father, which had driven them to their deed, grew less, and 
their longing for him increased; and it became possible for an 
ideal to emerge which embodied the unlimited power of the 
primal father against whom they had once fought as well as 
their readiness to submit to him. (p. 505) 
Again, however, the superego per se was never formally invoked in Freud‟s social 
theorizing until after the publication of The Ego and the Id. 
Cavalletto (2007) notes a chronological puzzle in Freud‟s work. Although The Future 
of An Illusion and Civilization and Its Discontents were published only two years apart 
(as Civilization and Its Discontents was originally published in 1929, despite the 1930 
version in my References section), they appear to be products of different 
theoretical mindsets. The Future of An Illusion invoked the terms of Freud‟s first theory 
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of the instincts, which resulted in cultural manifestations of unconscious wishes and 
instinctual desires – thoughts that are reminiscent of „Civilized‟ Sexual Morality and 
Modern Nervous Illness and in general, Freudian theorizing from 1905 to 1917. In 
contrast, as was previously mentioned, Civilization and Its Discontents invoked 
Freud‟s structural theory of the mind and his more recent theory of instincts involving 
the battle of Eros against death. Cavalletto suggests that the reason Freud ignored 
radical revisions to his theory and retreated to the earliest stages of his thinking in The 
Future of An Illusion is because Freud distrusted system building, so to speak. That is, 
he often adopted new ideas while at the same time remained attached to older, no 
longer fully compatible ones. In this sense, Freud followed a patchwork method of 
conceptualization, which one might argue renders him a true evolutionist! 
Of course, the biggest problem with Freud‟s adherence to the assumption that the 
dynamics of the individual mind correspond to the dynamics of macro-level social 
processes is that Freud would have a difficult time not only explaining the radical 
diversity between religions, cultures, and civilizations, but also the diversity within 
them. Indeed, just as Freud‟s psychological theory assumes psychic unity across 
individuals, his social theory assumes a kind of social unity across time, religions, 
cultures, and civilizations. Wallace (1983) argues that Freud can only apply 
psychoanalysis to the social realm metaphorically, and that for the most part, it is 
only with the smallest and most homogenous societies that a „group unconscious‟ 
might retain any meaning. 
Finally, by virtue of Freud‟s social theory mirroring his psychological theory, an illusion 
of credence is given to psychoanalysis. In other words, Freud‟s social theory might be 
regarded as a red herring insofar as criticisms that are launched towards it should 
really be aimed at his psychological theory if they wish to be effective (for criticisms 
against his social theory, see Wallace, 1983). In this sense, Freud‟s social theorizing 
merely furnishes and buttresses psychoanalysis, albeit redundantly. 
Conclusions 
Freud‟s social worldview was very much the product of the historical context in 
which it was developed, which consisted of the interplay between Freud‟s 
theoretical influences, personal life events, and cultural and political climate. These 
influences served to shape the formation of psychoanalysis in general and facilitated 
its extension to the social realm. By tracing the corresponding vicissitudes of Freud‟s 
psychological and social thought, it becomes evident that his conceptualization of 
the social world was merely a uni-directional projection of psychoanalysis, which was 
predicated on the biogenetic principle. This isomorphism was problematic because 
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it rendered Freud‟s psychological and social theories vulnerable to the same set of 
criticisms. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis was destined to invade other academic 
disciplines (Gay, 1989, p. xxii), and I contend that its strength is demonstrated in part 
by this ability to reach beyond psychology into other domains of inquiry. 
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